Emme Buckel | 2026 I.S. Symposium
±·²¹³¾±ð:ÌýEmme Buckel
°Õ¾±³Ù±ô±ð:ÌýDemocratic Political Judgment in the Age of Post-Truth: An Analysis of Arendt, Habermas, and Foucault
²Ñ²¹Âá´Ç°ù:ÌýPolitical Science
²Ñ¾±²Ô´Ç°ù:ÌýPsychology
´¡»å±¹¾±²õ´Ç°ù²õ:ÌýDésirée Weber, Sid Simpson
The capacity of ordinary citizens to make valid political judgments has been in question in the United States due to increased polarization, lack of political consensus, and the perpetuation of misinformation. These issues raise further questions about how political judgment should proceed and if contemporary issues can be addressed given the conditions of pluralism and the lack of shared epistemic grounding. I argue that existing conceptions of political judgment by three prominent thinkers illustrate some of the challenges and potential solutions to these problems. Hannah Arendt’s conception of the role of truth in politics helps to diagnose the lack of shared foundation upon which the determination of truth can occur. Jürgen Habermas’ idea that consensus can be achieved through deliberation and public reason provides a solution to many of the problems identified by Arendt, although many of the necessary conditions for ideal deliberation have also been eroded by a lack of a shared epistemic world. I provide a contrasting viewpoint to Habermas’ consensus-based theory of democracy, Chantal Mouffe’s conception of agonism, that I argue is better equipped to grapple with conditions of post-truth. Finally, Michel Foucault’s articulation of the relationship between truth and power, namely the creation of ‘truth discourses’ that shape how facts are understood, provides a critical insight into the conditions that have enabled the emergence of the post-truth era. I focus on Foucault’s conception of parrhesia to illuminate how truth discourses can be renegotiated. I argue that Mouffe’s notion of agonistic democracy guarantees that parrhesia can continuously challenge the ubiquity of power.
Posted in Symposium 2026 on May 1, 2026.
